CHAIN-177 — Automation Account runbook stores secrets in clear variables

Summary

Severity: High · Likelihood: High · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

An Azure Automation Account runbook uses plaintext variables (not encrypted variables) to store service account passwords. Anyone with Automation Operator role can read the variables.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_bak_002	Trigger
zt_wl_017	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — GET variables via Automation API; fields are plaintext.

Actor: Automation Operator
MITRE ATT&CK: T1552.001
Enabled by: zt_bak_002

Attacker gain: Service account passwords.

Step 2 — Authenticate with stolen creds.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078
Enabled by: zt_wl_017

Attacker gain: Service account access across the environment.

Blast radius

Initial access	Automation Operator role.
Max privilege	Service account scope.
Data at risk	Wherever the service account is authorised
Services at risk	Everything the runbook automates

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.