CHAIN-152 — Azure Bot managed identity with over-broad Graph scope

Summary

Severity: High · Likelihood: Medium · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

An Azure Bot runs in Teams and the bot's service principal has Chat.Read.All and Files.Read.All delegated — the developer couldn't figure out per-conversation scopes. A compromised bot becomes a tenant-wide Teams eavesdropper.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_ai_004	Trigger
zt_id_011	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Exploit bot endpoint or SP credential.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1190
Enabled by: zt_ai_004

Attacker gain: Bot SP access.

Step 2 — Call Graph to read any chat in any tenant the bot joined.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1213
Enabled by: zt_id_011

Attacker gain: Tenant-wide chat read.

Blast radius

Initial access	Bot compromise.
Max privilege	Tenant chat + file read.
Data at risk	Every Teams chat the bot has access to
Services at risk	Teams + OneDrive

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.