CHAIN-140 — Kubernetes workload identity shared across namespaces

Summary

Severity: High · Likelihood: Medium · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

Azure Workload Identity federation maps one Entra identity to a service account referenced in both dev and prod namespaces. A dev-namespace RCE yields the identity's tokens — same tokens prod uses. Namespace boundary is meaningless.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_wl_011	Trigger
zt_id_008	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Federated token exchange for the shared Entra ID.

Actor: Attacker in dev pod
MITRE ATT&CK: T1552.005
Enabled by: zt_wl_011

Attacker gain: Entra identity access.

Step 2 — Use identity to access resources intended only for prod pods.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078
Enabled by: zt_id_008

Attacker gain: Cross-namespace privilege escalation.

Blast radius

Initial access	Dev namespace compromise.
Max privilege	Prod workload identity scope.
Data at risk	Prod resources
Services at risk	Any Azure resource granted to the shared ID

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.