CHAIN-130 — Container Registry with admin user enabled

Summary

Severity: Medium · Likelihood: Medium · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

ACR has admin user enabled — a single shared credential that nobody rotates. CI systems and developers all use the same username/password. A single leak yields push rights into the registry, so attackers can insert malicious images.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_wl_018	Trigger
zt_data_001	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Harvest the ACR admin password from a CI log or developer machine.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1552.001
Enabled by: zt_wl_018

Attacker gain: Registry push rights.

Step 2 — Push a trojaned 'latest' tag; wait for pods to pull.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1195.002
Enabled by: zt_data_001

Attacker gain: Supply-chain compromise of every consumer.

Blast radius

Initial access	Leaked shared credential.
Max privilege	Push access to every repo in ACR.
Data at risk	Every consumer's runtime integrity
Services at risk	Every service pulling from this ACR

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.