CHAIN-127 — Batch account compute pool with storage cred in init script

Summary

Severity: High · Likelihood: Low · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

Azure Batch pool startup task contains a plaintext storage account key. Every pool VM boots with this in its metadata. An attacker on any Batch node can read it and access the storage account from elsewhere.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_wl_031	Trigger
zt_data_001	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Read CustomData / startup script.

Actor: Attacker on Batch node
MITRE ATT&CK: T1552.001
Enabled by: zt_wl_031

Attacker gain: Storage account key.

Step 2 — Authenticate from outside the Batch network.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1078
Enabled by: zt_data_001

Attacker gain: Persistent storage access.

Blast radius

Initial access	Batch node compromise.
Max privilege	Storage account owner-equivalent.
Data at risk	Full storage account
Services at risk	Storage, Any app sharing the storage account

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.