CHAIN-124 — AKS privileged pod + host path mount

Summary

Severity: Critical · Likelihood: Medium · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

A pod runs privileged: true AND mounts /var/run/docker.sock or /host. Container escape is trivial — the pod can exec into the host, ptrace other containers, or create new containers with arbitrary parameters.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_wl_010	Trigger
zt_wl_013	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Access the host socket; docker run --privileged -v /:/host attacker.

Actor: Compromised pod
MITRE ATT&CK: T1611
Enabled by: zt_wl_010

Attacker gain: Host filesystem access.

Step 2 — Dump kubelet creds; cluster admin.

Actor: Attacker on node
MITRE ATT&CK: T1552
Enabled by: zt_wl_013

Attacker gain: Cluster admin from single pod compromise.

Blast radius

Initial access	Any pod compromise.
Max privilege	Cluster admin.
Data at risk	Every pod's secrets
Services at risk	Entire cluster

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.