CHAIN-118 — Container App with external ingress + managed identity overprivileged

Summary

Severity: High · Likelihood: High · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

A Container App accepts public HTTP ingress AND its user-assigned managed identity holds Contributor at subscription scope. Any RCE in the app yields Azure management-plane takeover.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_wl_025	Trigger
zt_id_008	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Exploit app-layer vuln (SSRF, deserialization) in the Container App.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1190
Enabled by: zt_wl_025

Attacker gain: RCE inside container.

Step 2 — Call IMDS; get ARM token scoped as Contributor.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1552.005
Enabled by: zt_id_008

Attacker gain: Subscription-level privilege.

Blast radius

Initial access	Public Container App.
Max privilege	Subscription Contributor.
Data at risk	Every resource in the subscription
Services at risk	Azure RBAC plane

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.