CHAIN-085 — Redis cache exposed without AUTH

Summary

Severity: Critical · Likelihood: High · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

An Azure Cache for Redis has public network access enabled, and the developer enabled non-SSL port 6379 or disabled AUTH. Redis is internet-reachable, no auth required. Any attacker can KEYS *, read session tokens, and impersonate users.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_data_025	Trigger
zt_net_001	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Shodan-scan *.redis.cache.windows.net for 6379.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1595.001
Enabled by: zt_data_025

Attacker gain: Reachable Redis.

Step 2 — KEYS * and GET session:*; harvest tokens.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1005
Enabled by: zt_net_001

Attacker gain: Session tokens for any app backed by this Redis.

Blast radius

Initial access	Internet scan.
Max privilege	User sessions.
Data at risk	Every key in Redis
Services at risk	Apps using this Redis for sessions/cache

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.