CHAIN-061 — Unmonitored directory role change

Summary

Severity: High · Likelihood: Medium · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

No Activity Log alert is configured for role assignment changes AND Entra audit logs are not streamed to a SIEM. An attacker who gains Global Admin (via any other chain) can create a new admin, delete logs, and exit without leaving a correlatable trail.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_vis_021	Trigger
zt_vis_008	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Create a second Global Admin account as persistence.

Actor: Attacker-admin
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098
Enabled by: zt_vis_021

Attacker gain: Second admin account with no alert fired.

Step 2 — Lower audit log retention or filter to hide the change.

Actor: Attacker-admin
MITRE ATT&CK: T1070.001
Enabled by: zt_vis_008

Attacker gain: Forensic trail gap.

Blast radius

Initial access	Assumes prior admin escalation.
Max privilege	Persistence across password reset.
Data at risk	Directory, Audit integrity
Services at risk	Entra ID

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.