CHAIN-058 — Service principal with privileged Graph role + no cred rotation

Summary

Severity: Critical · Likelihood: High · Logic: ALL

Why this chain matters

A service principal holds a dangerous Microsoft Graph application permission (Directory.ReadWrite.All, AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All) and its client secret never expires. Any exposure of that secret — CI log leak, GitHub push, developer laptop exfil — is a permanent tenant backdoor.

Component rules

This chain fires when its trigger conditions are met by the following rules. Click any rule to see its detection logic and compliance mappings.

Rule ID	Role
zt_id_001	Trigger
zt_id_011	Trigger

Attack walkthrough

Step 1 — Grep GitHub / Postman / CI logs for the client secret.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1552.001
Enabled by: zt_id_001

Attacker gain: Valid SP credential.

Step 2 — Mint a Graph token and call directoryRoles to grant itself Global Admin.

Actor: Attacker
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098
Enabled by: zt_id_011

Attacker gain: Global Admin via application permission.

Blast radius

Initial access	Any secret leak.
Max privilege	Global Admin via self-promotion.
Data at risk	Directory, All app secrets, All mailboxes
Services at risk	Entra ID, Graph, All M365

How the logic works

The chain fires only when every rule above has at least one finding in the current scan. Missing any one rule breaks the chain — so remediating any single step disrupts the attack path.